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The Dutch Minimum Wage
Abstract 
The paper is part of a broader international project undertaken by the ILO and the European 
Commission. It studies the Dutch minimum wage from the perspective of country differences in 
minimum-pay regulations within the European Union with the aim of serving as an input into a dis-
cussion whether a European approach to such regulation may be desirable and feasible or not. The 
European issue itself is not considered here.
 
In a historical perspective, going back to the establishment of the minimum wage in the 1960s, 
three characteristic features are presented and discussed at some length: 
the very long tail of youth minimum wages staring at age 15 up to age 23 - the oldest age in     ●
  international comparison at which a full minimum wage applies; 
the pivotal role of the (net) minimum wage for determining (net) minimum social beneﬁ  ts     ●
  and therewith for much of public social-security spending;
the steep decline in recent decades of the minimum wage both in terms of purchasing power      ●
  and relative to the rest of the wage distribution.
A brief description is given of the mechanism of uprating over time of the wage level and the 
coverage of employees. The declining value since 1979 is shown and compared to the rather similar 
evolution of the US minimum wage.
The relations of the minimum wage to poverty, wage inequality, employment, wage bargaining 
and social dumping are scrutinised. It appears that the decline of the minimum wage has greatly 
reduced its labour-market signiﬁ  cance. As a result the well-known long-run Dutch wage moderation 
has affected lower levels of pay more than higher one inciting an increase in earnings inequality.
In one of two case studies, of retail trade where youth minimum wage earners are concentrated, 
shows how unions and employers are gradually beginning to perceive the downside of the long tail 
of very low youth minimum wages for the motivation of young workers and the productive innova-
tion of their business.Page ● 6
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The other case study, on income taxation up to slightly above the level of the minimum wage, 
indicates how following the recent introduction of a tax rebate for income from labour add stimulus 
to working part-time. It helps to understand that on an annual basis 30% of Dutch employees earn 
less than the statutory adult minimum wage while on an hourly basis only 5% are affected.
Possible lessons for - and, conversely, from - the European debate concern the need of a rethink 
of the special treatment of young workers, the linkage between the minimum wage and part-time 
employment, and the signiﬁ  cance of uprating mechanisms as well as the correspondence between 
minimum earnings and minimum beneﬁ  ts.Page ● 7
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The Dutch Minimum Wage
Introduction: features of the Dutch  1. 
minimum wage
The minimum wage and its context in the Netherlands have a number of special features that 
will surface again and again in this chapter. First, there is the very long tail of youth minimum wages, 
going all the way down to 30 per cent of the adult minimum wage (or about € 2.50 per hour) at the 
age of 15 – very low in international comparison – which goes together with a relatively old age of 
23 years before the adult rate starts to apply. Second, the coupling of the minimum wage to the (mini-
mum) beneﬁ  ts of the system of social insurance (unemployment WW and disability WAO/WIA) 
and social provisions (social assistance and the public old-age pension AOW) is a pivotal element 
of the Dutch socio-economic system which lends the minimum wage great importance for public 
ﬁ  nance extending well beyond pure government ﬁ  nance. This has resulted in a policy-driven, strong 
decline in the purchasing power of the minimum wage and its relative position in the wage distribu-
tion – which has well-nigh put an end to its role in providing a bottom for wage formation – and in 
complicated policy measures aimed at improving the income effects of paid work over and above 
social beneﬁ  ts. The strong decline, which has gone hand in hand with a strong growth of low-paid 
employment in the country since the early 1980s, is the third distinguishing feature.
The decline of the minimum wage is the most striking aspect of the signiﬁ  cant and almost 
secular general moderation of wages which has become the hallmark of Dutch wage formation 
and relates to the evolution of in-work poverty. At the same time, the Dutch context is one of very 
strong growth in head-count employment, which in a very short time has made the country the world 
champion of part-time employment. Between 1983 and 2006 the number of persons in employment 
increased by 3.2 million, from 4.9 to 8.1 million, of which2.6 million were in part-time jobs. As a 
result, the share of part-time jobs in employment grew from 21 per cent to a record-high of 45 per 
cent.1 Over roughly the same period (1979–2005) the number of low-wage jobs doubled from fewer 
than 600,000 to more than 1.2 million. That increase was concentrated in part-time jobs, where the 
1  Source: Eurostat. Part-time deﬁ  ned as working fewer than 35 hours per week, employment deﬁ  ned in accordance with 
ILO and OECD from a minimum of 1 hour a week.Page ● 10
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incidence of low pay grew from 17 to 27 per cent; part-time jobs now make up some 70 per cent of 
all low-wage jobs.2
In Section 2 we shall consider the Dutch system of minimum wages and in Section 3 the evolu-
tion of the minimum wage over time, comparing this to wages in general. Section 4 discusses ﬁ  ve 
potential effects of the minimum wage: on poverty, wage inequality, employment, wage bargaining 
and social dumping. In Section 5 two case studies are presented: one on the long tail of youth mini-
mum wages, with a focus on the most important employer of young people, retail, and the other 
on the relationship between the minimum wage, working part-time and income taxation. Section 6 
discusses possible conclusions for the European debate on the minimum wage to which this chapter 
aims to contribute.
2   Compare Salverda et al. (2008). Low pay is deﬁ  ned as below two-thirds of the hourly median wage. Page ● 11
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Rules for ﬁ  xing the minimum wage  2. 
and its coverage
Current basics of the Dutch minimum wage are as follows. Averaged over 2008 the minimum 
wage for persons aged 23 and over (‘adults’) amounts to €310.58 per week gross-to-the-employee, or 
about €266 net after tax and employees’ social contributions.3 Employees aged 15 to 22 are entitled 
to lower minimum wages following an age-related graduation ranging from 30 per cent of the adult 
minimum wage for 15 year olds to 85 per cent for 22 year olds (see Table 1). The Netherlands is 
unique in having such a long tail of youth minimum wages. Because of the tax system the net youth 
minimum wage up to the age of 17 virtually equals the gross wage even if working full-time.
Table 1: Minimum wages by age, €/week and per cent of the adult minimum wage, 2008
Age 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23+
€/week 93 107 123 141 163 191 225 264 311
% of adult 
minimum 30.0 34.5 39.5 45.5 52.5 61.5 72.5 85.0 100
Source: Ministry of  Social Affairs and Employment.
On top of the above amounts employees are entitled to receive from their employers the mini-
mum annual holiday allowance of 8 per cent of gross annual earnings4 and a 7.2 per cent reimburse-
ment of the obligatory health care contribution,5 both of which are subject to income taxation. In 
other words, on an annual basis the taxable gross minimum wage for employees amounts to about 
€18,600. 6
It should be noted that the Dutch minimum wage is not formally deﬁ  ned as an hourly wage, as is 
the case in, for example, the US or the UK. Instead it is a weekly amount that relates to the ‘normal 
working week’ as deﬁ  ned in the collective labour agreement (CLA) applying to the job.7 The mini-
3  Contributions may differ between industries. Until recently health-care insurance for employees up to a certain earn-
ings threshold was included, as a percentage of earnings up to a threshold, but as of 2006 this has been generalised 
to the entire population and now depends on the composition of the household.
4 A  legally  ﬁ  xed percentage based on the same law as the minimum wage.
5  A variable percentage depending on health care costs, paid up to a certain income threshold.
6  Contributions paid to occupational pensions and some social insurance contributions are tax exempt and shall be 
deducted. However, they differ between industries and are left included here.
7  As a result, the hourly amount differs between and within industries and sometimes even within ﬁ  rms. This com-
plicates research on the incidence of the minimum wage in spite of the fact that the variation is relatively modest, 
because of possible employment spikes at the minimum wages.Page ● 12
Wiemer Salverda
mum wage applies pro rata to part-time workers. As to the nature of payment, the minimum wage 
formally includes all regular payments such as for shift work, tips, commission bonuses, inconven-
ience payments and payments in kind. However, it excludes overtime earnings – for which longer 
hours have to be worked beyond the normal working week – and annual bonuses for proﬁ  t-sharing 
and the like; these have to be paid on top of the minimum wage. Employer contributions are added 
to the above gross amount to arrive at gross labour costs.8 The minimum wage is not legally enforced 
by an inspectorate as in, e.g., the UK; instead an underpaid employee has to take his or her employer 
to court to demand the payment due.9
Introduction and extension 2.1. 
For almost two decades after the Second World War, low pay was an integral part of Dutch 
general wage formation. Until the early 1960s all outcomes of collective wage negotiations had to 
be ofﬁ  cially approved by government-appointed ofﬁ  cials. This approval included an explicit check 
on the minimum income that would be available to a full-time, unskilled breadwinner and his family 
(SER 1997, 88). Evidently, the underlying worry concerned the income of the household, and not the 
quantity or nature of minimum-wage employment. There was broad consensus about the importance 
of the social partners’ joint recommendation on a ‘social minimum wage’ that was agreed in 1945. 
This mechanism of wage control led to prolonged wage moderation but collapsed in massive strikes 
for wage increases when the boom of the early 1960s brought unemployment down to very low lev-
els, below 1 per cent of the labour force. 
In 1964 the social partners agreed on an economy-wide minimum wage – a round ﬁ  gure of 
100 guilders a week was chosen – to be adopted in all CLAs. This was still meant for the household 
breadwinner. Government action followed only later when in 1969 a statutory minimum wage was es-
tablished by law, which applied to all employees aged 24 and over, men as well as women, irrespective 
of their household position. It should be noted, however, that adult female employment participation 
was still low at that time. Also, it applied only to workers working at least one third of normal working 
8  Many contributions – for example, to occupational pensions – have a franchise roughly equal to the minimum wage.
9  The Labour Inspectorate may advise employers to change their practices if they come across a case of payment below 
the minimum wage.Page ● 13
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hours. It took until 1993 before the latter condition was dropped because of its discriminatory effect 
on female employees.
A few years later the age threshold was lowered to the present 23 years (the ‘adult (statutory) 
minimum wage’) and ﬁ  nally in 1974 the famous long tail of Dutch youth minimum wages was intro-
duced after long opposition on the part of the employers for fear of increasing labour costs. Three 
arguments are currently given for this tail:10 young workers are less experienced and trained and have 
lower productivity, their needs are fewer than those of adults as they usually live at home and do not 
maintain a family and, third, higher earnings would make employment too attractive compared to 
continued schooling. The schooling argument is a recent invention and was absent at the time of in-
troduction. Unions have been advocating lowering the starting age of the adult minimum wage from 
23 to 21 or 18 years; in the political debate, by contrast, it has repeatedly been proposed to raise the 
adult age to 27.
Thus low pay, if identiﬁ  ed as the minimum wage, came to be treated separately from wages in 
general after 1964. However, an uprating mechanism was created at the same time, which linked the 
evolution of the minimum wage at regular half-yearly intervals to the growth of average negoti-
ated wages so that, in principle, it would be a ﬁ  xed percentage of this average, with some time lag. 
Together with a few statutory four-year upratings in the early 1970s this meant that at that time the 
minimum wage developed in parallel with other wages and effectively remained part and parcel of 
general wage formation.
During the same post-war period, 1945–74, social insurance was gradually established for em-
ployees (unemployment, illness, disability) and so were social provisions for the population in general 
(old-age pension, social assistance). The culminating point in its development was between 1969 and 
1974 when the minimum beneﬁ  ts of all social provisions were linked to the minimum wage, on a 
basis net of tax and contributions. This so-called ‘coupling’ is the second internationally distinctive 
feature of the Dutch minimum wage, in addition to the youth tail.
As a result, a legal entitlement to a minimum wage of some sort has been in force since 1993 for 
all individuals employed on a labour contract, irrespective of age, gender, household position, type of 
contract or number of weekly working hours – no fewer than 55 years after the US had introduced 
10 http://home.szw.nl/navigatie/dossier/dsp_dossier.cfm?set_id=77&doctype_id=9.Page ● 14
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the universal federal minimum wage in 1938 –, and the minimum wage has been given a pivotal role 
in Dutch public expenditure because of the coupling to minimum social beneﬁ  ts.
Uprating and endorsement 2.2. 
With the legal introduction of the statutory minimum wage in 1969 a mechanism was established 
for a bi-annual uprating of the minimum wage and a four-year special revision, which is basically 
still in force despite the fact that after 1979 it was frequently not enforced on the basis of special 
legislation. In 1993 a new, more general legal provision was introduced stipulating that no uprating 
will take place if the national ‘inactives-to-actives ratio’ exceeds a threshold of 82.6 per cent. Inac-
tives are deﬁ  ned as those receiving beneﬁ  ts, including the public old-age pension, while actives are 
those employed, including the self-employed and irrespective of their working hours. This rule can be 
understood from the importance of the coupling as any uprating automatically applies to minimum 
social beneﬁ  ts and therewith increases public expenditure related to social security.
The uprating links the minimum wage to the evolution of negotiated (CLA) wages (not actual 
individual earnings11) albeit with a time lag. In principle, this legal mechanism frees the level of the 
minimum wage from political inﬂ  uence, in contrast to the US where the increases are less frequent 
but often sizeable if adopted, or France where frequently political decisions – for example, on the 
occasion of general elections – spark special increases over and above the normal uprating. However, 
in actual practice the Dutch minimum wage has also been very sensitive to political decision-making. 
By special laws it was nominally lowered in the early 1980s (once for adults, several times for young 
people12) and ‘frozen’ relative to CLA wages for many years in the 1980s, during part of the 1990s 
and again recently between July 2003 and January 2006. On that last occasion the freeze was argued 
as the special four-year revision, and it occurred despite the fact that the inactives-to-actives ratio did 
not exceed the threshold stipulated by the law. This recent experience aptly illustrates the use of the 
11  Actual earnings differ because of ‘wage drift’, if people get paid above negotiated wages or become differently dis-
tributed over the grid of negotiated wages. Compare Salverda (2008) for more detail.
12  The graduation rules were changed, widening the original range (40–92.5 per cent) of 1974.Page ● 15
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minimum wage as a policy instrument as the government was hoping that the trade unions would 
adopt a similar freeze for all wages.
Though the minimum wage is not legally enforced, the Labour Inspectorate regularly investi-
gates underpayment. Recently (for 2006), it found underpayment for 0.3 per cent of employees in 
enterprises to an average amount of 9 per cent of the relevant minimum wage (SZW-AI 2008).13 
Young people and employees under mandatory extension or in smaller ﬁ  rms have more likely to be 
underpaid.
Table 2: Demographic characteristics of minimum-wage earners, %, 2005
Percent of minimum-wage earners  Per cent of employees in category
total men women total men woman
15–64 100 44 56 4.0 3.2 4.9
  full-time 27 2.2
  part-time 46 4.9
  ﬂ  exible 25 10.6
15–24 49 22 27 12.8 11.6 14.0
  full-time 12 10.3
  part-time 21 14.3
  ﬂ  exible 15 13.4
  15–19 23 10 13 16.8 14.7 18.9
  20–24 25 12 13 10.5 9.9 11.2
25–64 51 22 29 2.4 1.9 3.1
  full-time 15 1.3
  part-time 25 3.1
  ﬂ  exible 10 7.8
Note: Earnings at or below the minimum wage.
Source: Statistics Netherlands/Statline: structure of  earnings survey.
Coverage 2.3. 
Since the statutory minimum wage was extended, ﬁ  rst in 1974, to young employees and, later in 
1993, to employees on small part-time jobs the minimum wage has provided full legal coverage for 
all employees. The most recently known level of minimum-wage employment – for 2005 – is 284,000 
employees or 4.1 per cent of all employees.  The corresponding composition of minimum-wage em-
ployment by demographic characteristics – age and gender – for the most relevant age category of 
13  Underpayment amounted to 1.1 per cent in 2001 and 0.6 per cent in 2004. Page ● 16
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15–64 years is shown in Table 2.14 Four per cent of all employees earn the minimum wage. The per-
centages are based on, ﬁ  rst, the age-dependent levels of the minimum wage and second, the pro rata 
level per hour worked (accounting for the CLA-based weekly working hours) for part-time jobs.
Unfortunately, the dataset does not provide speciﬁ  cation in accordance with the legally important 
threshold age of 23 years. It is clear, however, that youths (12.8 per cent) have a more than ﬁ  ve times 
higher incidence than adults (2.4 per cent), while teenagers (16.8 per cent) have a seven times higher 
incidence. As those up to 25 years make up almost half (49 per cent) of all minimum-wage earners 
it seems plausible that adults, deﬁ  ned as 23 years and over, comprise well over half of all employees 
paid the minimum wage. Women (irrespective of age) constitute the clear majority and have a 50 per 
cent higher incidence than men, but gender differences among young people are relatively modest, 
with a 20 per cent higher incidence for women as compared to men, while they are relatively substan-
tial among adults (63 per cent).
Plain full-time workers comprise only one quarter of all minimum-wage workers, much less than 
in 1995 when they still made up one third. Part-time workers comprise about half of all minimum-
wage workers, while those on ﬂ  exible contracts constitute the remaining quarter. Considered on an 
annual basis the ﬂ  exible category is basically working part-time too; as for youths, there is relatively 
little difference between them and part-time workers. 
Apart from age and gender, no further demographic detail is available from this source, but an-
other source shows an incidence of minimum wages among ethnic minorities twice as high as the 
average (SZW-AI 2008, 49).15
14  Some 5,000 minimum-wage employees are aged 65+.
15  This source covers private enterprise only and gives a much lower average incidence (1.9%) than shown in Table 1, 
which seems worrying for statistical reliability.Page ● 17
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Minimum wage and wage earnings 3. 
Decline of the minimum wage 3.1. 
Since its voluntary introduction by the social partners in 1964 at the level of NLG 100 (or €45) 
the adult minimum wage has increased almost seven-fold to the present level of €311. This is the 
result of the regular and special (four-year) upratings on the one hand, combined with a nominal 
reduction of three per cent in 1984 and freezes during 10 out of the subsequent 24 years on the other 
hand. As a result the minimum wage ﬁ  rst grew ahead of (consumer) prices16 until the end of the 
1970s, but has lagged strongly behind since and, as we will see later, also behind other wages.






1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006
ADULT MW
AVERAGE MW BY AGE
Note: Annual averages, excluding annual holiday allowance, etc.
Source: Author’s own calculations based on Statistics Netherlands: minimum wage and price statistics, and Ministry  
  of  Social Affairs and Employment.
16   We shall come back to wages deﬂ  ated by product prices below.Page ● 18
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Figure 1 depicts the evolution of both the adult minimum wage and the average minimum wage, 
which also accounts for youth minimum wages.17 Most of the decline is concentrated in the ﬁ  rst 
half of the 1980s but it has continued slowly during most of the years since 1985. After 1995 the 
real minimum wage ﬁ  rst went up somewhat, by four per cent in total from €287 to €299 in 2003, but 
subsequently fell back to about the initial level (€289 in 2007). As no speciﬁ  c measures were taken for 
youth minimum wages over these later years its development ran parallel to the adult rate.
On balance, the minimum wage has fallen in real terms by 21 per cent for adults and 28 per cent 
for all since the end of the 1970s. Notably, the latter decline has matched that of the US Federal mini-
mum wage, which in contrast to the Dutch minimum wage has a single value for all ages. The Dutch 
coupling to minimum beneﬁ  ts implies that the latter have undergone the same decline.18 However, 
for minimum-wage workers the decline concerns the weekly or monthly amount. Though this does 
not make a difference to the income for the receiving employee, the estimated real minimum wage 
per hour of work fell by less (17 per cent for adults over 1979–2005) when accounting for the reduc-
tion in average full-time working hours, which also applied to minimum-wage workers.
Figure 2: Negotiated wages in the private and public sectors, and minimum wages, deﬂ  ated,













Note: Deﬁ  ned on a weekly/monthly basis.
Source: Statistics Netherlands, Historical series Statline for Negotiated wages and consumer prices.
17  Using weights of the age distribution (individual years 15–22, and 23+) of minimum-wage earners in 1979.
18   Only the old-age pension has developed slightly more favourably because of special measures.Page ● 19
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Comparison to other wages 3.2. 
The decline of the minimum wage has led to a sea change in its relationship with other wages, 
before and after the early 1980s. As Figure 2 indicates, minimum wages and negotiated wages moved 
upward in tandem over the 1960s and 1970s, but have all lagged behind prices since and at the same 
time have started to diverge strongly from one another. The minimum wage for long years devi-
ated particularly from negotiated wages in private enterprise, up to 1997. Public-sector negotiated 
wages,19 by contrast, after 1979 fell even more than the adult minimum wage and moved roughly in 
parallel with the age-weighted average of minimum wages. This decoupling of both minimum wages 
and public-sector pay from private-sector pay rates is a major, much less familiar20 aspect of the 
well-known Wassenaar Accord of 1982, which was concluded under government pressure by unions 
and employers. It served to lower public expenditure and thus to mitigate the moderation of after-tax 
wages. On balance, between 1979 and 2007 the adult minimum wage lagged 19 per cent behind the 
private-sector average of CLA wages, for the most part before 1995 as only a little more than 0.5 per 
cent of this decline has occurred since that year.
Actual individual hourly earnings evolved slightly ahead of negotiated wages and as a result di-
verged even more from minimum wages. This is shown for average21 earnings in Figure 3, Panel A. 
While the adult minimum wage was equivalent to about 64 per cent of average wage earnings in 1979, 
the proportion had declined to 48 per cent by 2005 (by a quarter). The decline was faster – one third 
– for the weighted average minimum wage, which fell from 55 per cent to 37 per cent of the average. 
The declines of the two ratios largely resembled that of the US Federal minimum wage which, how-
ever, has a much lower relative level and suffered a decline from 41 per cent to 23 per cent.
However, a comparison with the average is sensitive to outliers in the wage distribution and also 
includes the highest levels of pay, which bear little relevance to the minimum wage at the other end 
of the spectrum. It seems better to draw the comparison with the median wage. The upper echelons 
of pay and therefore the averages have developed differently between countries, rising signiﬁ  cantly 
19  They underwent the same nominal lowering by 3 per cent in 1984 and freezes for many years.
20  Compared to wage moderation in general.
21  Median earnings – to which we will come back in Section 4.2 – seem a better measure than average earnings. Note that 
the gap between average and median earnings differs between countries and over time. For the Netherlands it grew 
from 108 per cent in 1980 to 112 per cent in 1999, according to OECD data (the US ratio grew from 111 per cent to 
129 per cent between 1980 and 2002).Page ● 20
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more in the US than in the Netherlands (compare Atkinson and Piketty 2007). Panel B indicates how 
this brings up the relative level of the US minimum wage while it hardly affects the Dutch level. As a 
result the US minimum wage and the Dutch average minimum wage have been circling around each 
other since the early 1990s, at about 42 to 43 per cent of the respective median.Page ● 21
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Figure 3: Minimum wage (adult and weighted for all ages) as per cent of average and 
median wages*, Netherlands and US, 1970–2005). 

























Source: Author’s own estimations based on Statistics Netherlands, Structure of  Earnings Surveys (full-time equivalent
   based), and EPI, State of  Working America 2006/2007Page ● 22
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Effects of the minimum wage 4. 
The minimum wage can affect different aspects of the economy, for example, wages, incomes 
and employment, but also educational attainment and productivity. There is an extensive literature, 
particularly about employment effects, and in this chapter we can only touch upon potential effects in 
a univariate way, by sketching the existing situation for one aspect at a time: poverty, wage inequality, 
employment, wage bargaining and social dumping, and asking what the minimum wage may have to 
do with it, positively or negatively.
Poverty 4.1. 
There is no immediate relationship between the minimum wage, or low pay for that matter, and 
poverty. The former, a wage, is the result of a labour-market transaction – concerning both the wage 
level and the number of hours of paid work – while the latter, an income, depends on the household 
situation of the receiver of the wage, which includes the needs but also the possible incomes of the 
other members of the household. An example may illustrate this: the long range of ofﬁ  cial US pov-
erty levels, covering no less than 48 types of households, spans a range of hourly earnings that ex-
tends from less than USD 5 (or about the level of the Federal minimum wage) for a single, unrelated 
individual at one end to almost USD 22 (or about 1.33 times the median hourly wage and roughly 
equal to the average wage) for a nine-person household with one child under 18 at the other end.22
The Netherlands does not operate such ofﬁ  cial poverty measures. The coupling of the net mini-
mum wage to minimum social beneﬁ  ts – this applies to adult couples;23 singles are entitled to 70 
per cent of that minimum and single parents to 90 per cent – is supposed to keep earners of the 
minimum wage out of poverty by deﬁ  nition, according to Dutch social policy. That policy has taken 
little notice of the steep decline in its purchasing power, found in Figure 1.24 Naturally, this is if the 
minimum wage is applicable in the ﬁ  rst place (which, naturally, is not the case for the self-employed), 
22  www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/threshld/thresh06.html: BLS poverty thresholds in 2006; assuming one earner 
putting in 2000 hours of work per annum. CRS (2005) shows how up to 1980 the Federal minimum wage enabled a 
full-time worker to keep a family of three out of poverty while it has since lagged behind by 30 per cent.
23  Naturally, the coupling creates a poverty trap for two-adult households that move from beneﬁ  ts to work at the mini-
mum wage.
24  The strong growth of two-earner households and of occupational pensions that top up the public pension may help 
to explain the absence of political action in this respect. Page ● 24
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is earned on a full-time basis per annum and is received by a household comprising just two adults. 
Apparently even so poverty is not nil but a slightly declining proportion of 6 to 8 per cent of the 
population25. However, the most often used European measure of poverty of 60 per cent of equiv-
alised median disposable household income indicates a signiﬁ  cantly higher and virtually unchanged 
level of 10 per cent.26 The so-called ‘low-income threshold’ that is often used in Dutch research and 
is based on the (deﬂ  ated) social assistance norm for a single person in 1979 (that is, before the decline 
in real minimum beneﬁ  ts took off) is found to generate a similar fraction.
Poverty in work is non-trivial, amounting to 310,000 persons in 2005, following the low-income 
deﬁ  nition. More than four per cent of all persons in employment aged between 21 and 64 are work-
ing poor (Vrooman et al. 2007, 79). This implies a doubling of the number of the early 1990s, most 
of this growth being concentrated in the ﬁ  rst half of the 1990s (Figure 4). The role of the self-
employed – of which the Netherlands has relatively many – is quantitatively important particularly 
in low-wage industries and therefore the fact that the minimum wage does not apply to them may 
give them a relatively large role in in-work poverty. In addition, part-time work – to which we will 
return – plays an important role as almost half of the working poor were in part-time employment 
in 2005 (Vrooman et al. 2007, 79). The ﬁ  gure also indicates that the working poor now make up 23 
per cent of all persons in poverty, up from 13 per cent in 1995 – implying a surging overlap between 
work and poverty. However, this is a gross underestimation of the importance of in-work poverty as, 
ﬁ  rst, it does not count the other non-working members of working-poor households and, second, it 
is taken as a share of all poor including those aged 65 or over who are not part of the working-age 
population. Other data – using the European measure of 60 per cent of equivalised household in-
come – indicate that the working poor make up more than 40 per cent of all poor between the ages 
of 15 and 64.27 Poverty is deﬁ  ned on annual income and part-time workers may be working poor 
because of low hourly pay but also because of limited working hours – see Case study 2 for a discus-
25  Soede and Vrooman (2008), 22 (101 per cent social policy minimum indicator).
26  Compare Marx (2007).
27  A rough calculation using the Eurostat Structural Indicator of at-risk-of-poverty combined with the employment rate. 
Again, other household members are not included in the count.Page ● 25
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sion of how the tax system incites people to keep annual earnings below the minimum wage and thus 
increases the risk of poverty.
Figure 4: Working poor by type of position, persons x 1000, 1990–2005




























































% OF ALL POOR
Notes: According to ‘low-income threshold’; break in series in 2000; * provisional.
Source: Vrooman et al. (2007), 46 and 83
A direct link of poverty to earning the minimum wage cannot be established from this report, but 
Soede and Vrooman (2008, 87) do attribute the high rate of poverty for employees working in hotels 
and catering to the high incidence of minimum wages in that industry. It is suggestive, however, that 
the stabilisation of in-work poverty during the second half of the 1990s coincided with the stabilisa-
tion of the minimum wage, while the increases in poverty before and after this period coincide with 
a weakening of the minimum wage. Page ● 26
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Wage disparity 4.2. 
Figure 5 depicts the distribution of hourly wage earnings for the most recent year available. It 
indicates where the range of minimum wages is found from the age of 15 up to the adult rate.28 
The range below the adult rate comprises an estimated 10 per cent of all 6.9 million employees. This 
includes young workers who are paid more than their age-speciﬁ  c minimum wage but less than the 
adult rate. Plausibly they make up the six per cent difference to the four per cent share of all persons 
earning their age-speciﬁ  c minimum wage that was found before (Table 2). Naturally, their aggregate 
shares in total earnings are far below these employment shares.
The relative position of the minimum wage in the distribution has deteriorated in line with the 
considerable fall against average and median earnings that was pictured in Figure 3.29 Figure 6 spells 
out the evolution of the distributive position of the adult minimum wage in more detail. Its level has 
clearly fallen from well above the lowest decile of the hourly earnings distribution in 1979 (€10.56 
against €8.54) to the same level (€8.81). The minimum wage fell while the ﬁ  rst decile, after an initial 
fall, gained some value. At the same time, the higher echelons of the distribution have clearly moved 
up: the median wage saw its purchasing power rise by 20 per cent and the 90th percentile by 31 per 
cent. As a result, the minimum wage fell from 80 per cent of the median to 56 per cent, and from 
49 per cent of the 90th percentile to 31 per cent. The implication is that the minimum wage has also 
fallen against and below the low-pay threshold of 66 per cent of the median wage. Clearly, the Dutch 
wage distribution has widened signiﬁ  cantly. The ratio between the ﬁ  rst and ninth deciles rose from 
2.54 to 3.22 or by 27 per cent; more than half the increase (16 per cent) concerns the lower half of 
the distribution. Apparently, the well-known Dutch wage moderation has been stronger the lower the 
level of pay.
28  Note the earlier caveat about variation in hourly minimum wages depending on CLA. Here an average is used.
29  Figure 8 is head-count based and shows a higher ratio of the minimum wage to the median than Figure 4, Panel B, 
which is full-time equivalent based. The latter approach weights lower wages less because of their concentration in 
part-time jobs.Page ● 27
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Source: Estimated from Statistics Netherlands, Structure of  Earnings Survey 2005 tabulated data.
Figure 6: Deciles of hourly wage earnings and the adult minimum wage, 1979-2005(€ per hour, 







1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
DECILE 9 +31%
DECILE 5 +20%
DECILE 1  +4%
ADULT MW  -17%
Note:   This disregards annual holiday allowances and bonuses, the importance of  which increases with the wage level.
   Thus it underestimates the ninth and ﬁ  fth deciles compared to the ﬁ  rst and the minimum wage.
Source:   Author’s calculations on Statistics Netherlands Structure of  Earnings Surveys and CPB, 2006, Table A.7; 
  see also Figure 2.
30  Note the formal variation in hourly minimum wages depending on CLA already mentioned. Here an average is 
used.Page ● 28
Wiemer Salverda
It is clear that the decline of the minimum wage has not directly boosted the incidence of low 
pay. However, had the minimum wage remained at the same absolute level instead of suffering the 17 
per cent decline in purchasing power the effects might not have been much different as the ﬁ  rst decile 
of the wage distribution retained its value. More important, the implication may simply be that the 
minimum wage has lost its signiﬁ  cance for wage determination. Or, as the Dutch Central Planning 
Bureau recently put it, ‘at the end of the 1990s the statutory minimum wage no longer seemed to play 
the role of providing an effective bottom wage for the lower end of the labour market’ (CPB 2008, 
94). If, by contrast, the minimum wage had retained its relative position, the ﬁ  rst decile might have 
moved up much more and wage inequality would have changed less, if not remained unchanged. We 
return to the issue below in the next section where employment is discussed. 
The Netherlands has been practising wage moderation since the early 1980s. In particular, wages 
have lagged behind the growth of productivity, more than behind the rise of prices, as Figure 6 dem-
onstrates. Between 1979 and 2005 hourly labour productivity grew by 44 per cent (EU-KLEMS 2008) 
and all wages lagged behind, on balance, including even the highest wages, whose 31 per cent growth 
comes closest. As a result, the labour share of value added has declined substantially, especially from 
64 per cent of GDP in 1979 to 56 per cent in 1985 with only small ﬂ  uctuations since ending at 56 
per cent in 200531. This took place in spite of potentially upward effects of the signiﬁ  cant growth 
in employment rates among the population and the decline in self-employment, which would both 
tend to reduce the capital share in the functional distribution of earnings. The contribution of the 
minimum wage to this decline is not evident, given the parallel decline of the US minimum wage 
(Figure 3), while at the same time the US labour share did not fall after the 1970s but showed slightly 
larger ﬂ  uctuations around an average of 58 per cent.
Finally, there is no clear proof that lower growth or even a decline in productivity in the segment 
of the economy where most of the low paid are employed (for example, agriculture, retail, hotels and 
restaurants and personal services) would warrant much stronger wage moderation at lower levels of 
pay. For example, in retail – the leading low-pay sector – productivity growth matched the national 
average in the Netherlands, and far exceeded that in the US (EU-KLEMS 2008).Clearly, the growth 
31  Calculated from EU-KLEMS database. The frequently used labour share adjusted for self-employment is left aside 
here as it disregards the often stronger concentration of the self-employed in low-paying industries.Page ● 29
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of low-wage employment partly reﬂ  ects wages policies including the lowering of the minimum wage, 
that have not allowed productivity gains to be sufﬁ  ciently translated into higher actual earnings. 
Employment 4.3. 
Decline of minimum-wage employment: The importance of minimum-wage employment has 
declined signiﬁ  cantly in recent decades. The incidence of the age-speciﬁ  c minimum wages decreased 
signiﬁ  cantly, from 8.3 per cent tot 2.1 per cent of all employees between 1976 and 1992 (Figure 7). 
The legal extension of the minimum wage to small part-time jobs in 1993 and some policy pressures 
discussed in the next section (and perhaps also improved statistical reporting from 1995 onwards) led 
to a new increase in the incidence to 5.0 per cent, but over the last 10 years its level has shown a slight 
decline to between 4 and 5 per cent. By contrast, application of the uniform adult minimum wage to 
all employees shows a higher level throughout and no decline in recent years. The gap between the 
two indicates the important role of young workers who get paid above their age-speciﬁ  c minimum 
wage but below the adult rate.
Figure 7 also compares these developments to the evolution of US Federal minimum wage em-
ployment. This fell from 15 per cent of all employees in 1980 to less than 3 per cent recently,32 while 
the hikes of the minimum wage of 1991 and 1997 are reﬂ  ected in a clear increase. In a sense, the US 
incidence compares to both Dutch indicators as, on the one hand, the US has no age-speciﬁ  c rates 
and, on the other, its relative level is below the Dutch adult minimum wage. The weighted average 
of Dutch minimum wages, which has a relative position close to the US, shows up an estimated inci-
dence of 5.7 per cent, still higher but much closer to the US incidence.
32  Data relate to workers paid by the hour only; they make up a virtually steady 60 per cent of all US employees.Page ● 30
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Figure 7: Incidence of minimum wages, Netherlands and US, 1974–2005  
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≤ NL MW AVERAGE
≤ US MW
Sources: Author’s own calculations based on Dutch Statistics: minimum wage statistics and structure of  earnings 
  surveys, and CPB, MEV2007 Table A7; BLS (2005)










Note:   Part-time includes ﬂ exible contracts which are on average half-time on an annualised basis.
Sources: Author’s own calculations based on Statistics Netherlands: minimum-wage and structure of  earnings statis- 
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Figure 8 depicts the composition of minimum-wage employment along three dimensions: age, 
gender and working hours. Despite some data problems clear trends appear. Until the mid-1980s 
the majority of minimum-wage earners were youths below the age of 23, but since then their share 
has rapidly declined to not much more than one third from the early 1990s onwards. This occurred 
primarily – but not solely – because of a demographic shrinking of the young age group. By contrast, 
the gender composition tended to change only slowly to the disadvantage of men. However, taking 
into account the very rapid increase in the female share in overall employment – much faster than in 
most other countries, their employment-to-population ratio in the Netherlands grew by 32 percent-
age points between 1979 and 2003 – it is remarkable that the female share in minimum-wage em-
ployment declined at all. This could occur because a large part of them are also youths whose share 
declined. Finally, the part-time share is continuously increasing with an apparent jump when small 
part-time jobs started to be covered by the minimum wage in 1993. However, that change hardly af-
fected the gender and age divisions..
Figure 9: Incidence of age-speciﬁ  c minimum wages among employees by age and gender    












Note:   Age group 16–22 and 23–64 except 1995–2005 (15–24 and 25–64).
Sources: Author’s own calculations based on Statistics Netherlands: minimum-wage and structure of  earnings statis- 
 tics.Page ● 32
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Unsurprisingly, the incidence of the minimum wage among demographic groups varies widely 
(Figure 9). The incidence among adults declined somewhat over the 1980s but has remained roughly 
stable at the lower level of around 3 per cent since. The incidence of minimum wages among youth 
declined much more strongly, from a peak of over 30 per cent in 1976 to 12 to 13 per cent recently, 
reinforcing the demographic decline mentioned above. Women have a higher chance of earning the 
minimum wage than men in both age groups but the gender difference is relatively small for young 
workers. The incidence among adult men has remained basically stable over the period, at around 2 
per cent. Therefore the decline for adults is concentrated among women. They had a much higher 
incidence than adult men in the 1970s but rapidly closed most of the gap by the 1990s. Since then 
their level has been falling only slightly but now it has come very close to that of adult men. Thus the 
minimum wage has also become less important at the margins of the labour market where youths 
and women are often found.
Aggregate employment drifting towards low pay:
The role of the minimum wage in job growth is not obvious. The incidence of both the age-
speciﬁ  c and the adult minimum wages has fallen considerably, as we have already observed. Figure 10, 
Panel A, brings the latter together with the relative position of the minimum wage in the distribution 
and evolution of low-wage employment.
The simultaneous fall of the relative level of the minimum wage and the employment share of 
minimum-wage jobs is in line with the literature on the American minimum wage, the evolution of 
which is illustrated in Panel B. Changing the minimum wage seems to affect the distribution of wages, 
and therewith earnings inequality, without having much of an effect on employment. In principle, a 
decline in the minimum wage will enhance employers’ room for manoeuvre for hiring people on low 
pay but those options may not be fully used, for example, for reasons of labour market competition 
or even of fairness, or they may lead to substitution for better pay instead of additional hiring.
The two panels also indicate the shares of employees who are paid at or below the low-pay 
threshold of two thirds of median hourly earnings. That share has increased in the Netherlands but 
only lately, from the mid-1990s on. In 1979 the minimum wage as a percentage of the median was 
well above the low-pay threshold of 66 per cent of the median. This changed during the second half 
of the 1980s when the former ratio tucked below the latter. From that moment on low-wage employ-
ment was also positively greater than minimum-wage employment. However, it did not increase but Page ● 33
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basically stayed at the same level until the mid-1990s, while minimum-wage employment fell strongly 
together with the relative minimum wage until 1993. Since then the employment share has increased 
slightly, while the relative level of the minimum wage has tended slowly to decline further. Apparent-
ly, most of the decline of the minimum wage hardly affected the amount of low-wage employment. 
The latter quickly increased between 1994 and 1998 and subsequently has been ﬂ  uctuating around a 
level that ﬁ  nally exceeded the initial 1979 incidence of minimum-wage employment, albeit only by a 
few percentage points.
Conversely, the low-wage employment rate in the US remained virtually stable at around 25 per 
cent despite the strong decline in the position of the minimum wage in the earnings distribution. 
Apparently, the lowering of the American minimum wage incited a lowering of minimum-wage em-
ployment and therewith a widening of the earnings range of low pay but no increase in the share of 
low-wage employment.Page ● 34
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Figure 10: Relative pay level of and employment share at minimum wage, 1979–2005
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Sources: Author’s own calculations: see previous ﬁ  gures; BLS, 2005.Characteristics of  minimum wage workers: 
  2005, Table 10; and Mishel et al. (2006), Table 3.4.Page ● 35
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The ﬁ  rst, stylized conclusion is that the Dutch adult minimum wage fell from over 70 per cent to 
54 per cent of the median, while low-wage employment fully replaced minimum-wage employment 
and grew somewhat above it. However, though the increase is modest on balance it hides a consid-
erable demographic composition shift of the minimum-wage population towards adults. Second, a 
lower minimum wage may increase low pay opportunities for employers, as it did before 1993, but 
apparently the actual use of such opportunities depends on economic and labour market conditions 
more than the other way around. It is clear nevertheless that the changing signiﬁ  cance of the mini-
mum wage as a binding institution has enabled the growth of low-wage employment. However, had 
the minimum wage remained unchanged most of the current low-wage employment would still have 
been there, albeit under the label of minimum-wage employment. 
Figure 11: Head-count and hours-count employment–population rates for low pay and 






1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
LOW (+2.6%) MIDDLE (-4.3%) HIGH  (+1.8%)
Source: elaborated from Salverda et al. (2008), Figure 2.11.
In fact, lLow-wage employment growth in the Netherlands seems to have in fact ‘cannibalised 
better-paid jobs’ instead of adding to net employment growth. There is some indication of such 
an effect here. Head-count employment rates have grown for low-paid employment as well as the 
better-paid rest of employment; in other words, the overall employment rate grew sufﬁ  ciently fast to Page ● 36
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augment the number of paid-paid employees in spite of low-wage growth33. However, if we move 
closer to the real economy and measure employment in terms of hours worked, the better-paid 
hours of work per capita actually tend to decline. Figure 11 looks at the evolution of low pay per 
capita of the working-age population compared to that of high pay (symmetrically deﬁ  ned as over 
and above 1.5 times the median hourly wage) and the middle between both. On balance, between 
1979 and 2005, the better-paid employment-to-population ratio fell by 2.4 percentage points, while 
the low-paid ratio increased by a similar amount. If we split the better-paid part into the high-wage 
end on the one hand, deﬁ  ned as over and above 1.5 times the median hourly wage, and the remain-
ing middle in between the high and low tails, we ﬁ  nd that the volume of high-end employment also 
grew (+1.8 percentage points). By contrast, the middle of the distribution shrunk signiﬁ  cantly. Its 
full-time equivalent rate of the working-age population declined by 4.3 percentage points from more 
than 36 per cent to 32 per cent. Given the growing level of employees’ educational attainment, and 
therewith their productive capacities, it seems implausible that this growth reﬂ  ects a lower quality of 
current labour supply as compared to that of the 1970s; instead it is consistent with a cannibalisation 
of better pay by low pay, that is, a downward shift of pay levels. 
Wage bargaining 4.4. 
The presence of a statutory minimum wage may, ﬁ  rst, reduce the relevance of collective wage 
bargaining for the part of the economy where pay is governed by the minimum wage. It may, second, 
reduce incentives for becoming a union member for the purpose of wage bargaining. And, third, 
it may also affect collective negotiations themselves. There is no clear sign of the ﬁ  rst effect as the 
33  See Salverda et al. (2008), 51.Page ● 37
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coverage of collective agreements in the Netherlands is and remains high, at about 80 per cent, but, 
naturally, a very low and falling minimum wage is no challenge to collective bargaining in itself. 
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There are, however, indications of a decline in union membership. It has fallen in general, albeit 
slowly, from around one third in the early 1980s to a little more than a quarter today. Particularly 
among the occupants of the jobs most affected by the minimum wage, that is, elementary-level jobs, 
union membership is low and rapidly declining – from 77 per cent of the national average in 1997 to 
48 per cent in 2004, as shown in Figure 12. However, given the surprisingly steady or even increasing 
levels for most other characteristics – including women and part-time workers – the decline points to 
a composition shift among those occupying elementary jobs, especially a swing towards more young 
and part-time workers, instead of a decline per se. This is not so much a direct effect of the minimum 
wage as a reﬂ  ection of an increased marginal and temporary attachment as a consequence of the very 
low levels of minimum pay.
Given the unchanged level of CLA coverage the third important question is whether the col-
lective agreements themselves have been affected. Indeed, since the mid-1990s the government has 
been pressing the social partners to improve incorporation of the minimum wage in their CLAs. It 
complained that the lowest pay scales of the agreements were situated above the statutory minimum Page ● 38
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wage and thus prevented the hiring of employees at that level of pay. The government started to 
monitor the agreements, threatening to no longer declare them generally binding. 
Figure 13: Lowest and average agreed scales in collective labour agreements and the adult minimum 










1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
AVERAGE SCALES (1983=100)
LOWEST SCALES (% ABOVE MW)
ADULT MW (1983=100)
AVERAGE SCALES (DEFLATED, 1983=100)
LOWEST SCALES (DEFLATED, 1983=100)
ADULT MW (DEFLATED, 1983=100)
Note: * Except nominal lowest scales which are indicated as a percentage of  the adult minimum.
Source: SZW/DCA (1991), SZW, Voor- en Najaarsrapportages, CBS-Statline: historical series of  wage rates 
  1972=100, after 2002 extrapolated with series 2000=100 and Salverda et al. (2008), Figures 1.1 and 
 3.8.
Figure 13 indicates the effects of these pressures. The average of the lowest scales has lagged 
behind the average of all scales and moved closer to the minimum wage. Initially, between 1983 and 
1993 the lowest scales moved roughly parallel with the other scales, while the minimum wage increas-
ingly lagged behind. Between 1993 and 1997 the share of CLAs with the lowest scale below 105 per 
cent of the minimum wage grew extensively, from 20 per cent (of covered employees) in 1993 to 82 
per cent in 1997 (Tros 2000). Thus the lowest scales on average have managed to bridge half the gap 
to the minimum wage and have shifted gear, running parallel now with the minimum wage instead 
of average wages. This is particularly noticeable after 2003 when the minimum wage lagged behind 
CLA wages again as a result of a new freeze. In terms of purchasing power – that is, after deﬂ  ation 
for consumer prices – the lowest scales have fallen on balance by more than 10 per cent compared 
to the level of 1983, a development that comes close to the decline of the minimum wage discussed Page ● 39
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above. Apparently, the social partners did not intend to adapt their collective bargaining but have 
given in to government pressure.
However, adopting the minimum wage in collective agreements does not necessarily mean that 
the lower scales are actually used in practice when hiring new employees. It seems likely that the 
relevant collective agreements for low-wage industries were already aligned with the minimum wage 
while the new government pressure affected other industries in which the minimum wage is of little 
relevance, such as construction where wages are traditionally well above the minimum wage. Thus the 
adoption of the lower scales may have been mainly a paper exercise. Unfortunately, in spite of the 
very extensive CLA coverage the Netherlands has no data that can tell us about the actual use of the 
grid of wages scales in employment. However, the Labour Inspectorate found in a special report in 
1998 that the overwhelming majority (86 per cent) of companies did not use the new scales and only 
6 per cent of their employees were found there (Ackermann and Klaassen 1998). It is also telling that 
between 1995 and 2005 the percentage of employees earning up to 105 per cent of the minimum 
wage has tended to decline.
Social dumping 4.5. 
Both the statutory nature of the Dutch minimum wage and the generally binding nature of col-
lective agreements prevent social dumping in the sense of the Laval case. This does not mean that 
semi-legal and wholly illegal activities may not undermine existing pay practices, however. Particularly 
the main temp agencies – which are also governed by collective labour agreements – are now actively 
engaged in investigating, in cooperation with the Labour Inspectorate, such ﬂ  y-by-night practices 
with the aim of taking legal action to stop them. Given the strong decline of the minimum wage in 
the Netherlands there is no reason to expect wage costs at this level to have stimulated offshoring 
activities.Page ● 40
Wiemer SalverdaPage ● 41
The Dutch Minimum Wage
Case studies 5. 
Case study 1: Does retail trade needs such low youth  5.1. 
minimum wages?
As we have seen, a particular feature of the Dutch minimum wage is its very long tail for young 
workers (Table 1); this was originally introduced in 1974 and made even longer in the 1980s and 
seems mainly based on presumably lower productivity and lower personal needs. Special provisions 
for youth are not unique to the Netherlands and any discussion about possible European measures 
regarding the minimum wage will have to face the youth issue. This is why we shall pay it particular 
attention here. The Dutch tail, including the age at which the adult rate applies, has been a bone of 
contention ever since its introduction and a European view treating youth minimum pay may be of 
relevance to the further debate in the Netherlands with regard to both the very low levels for youths 
and the high age at which the adult wage starts to apply.
Young workers’ concentration in low-paid work






France UK Ireland Nether-
lands
Greece* Spain US
15 64 75    70 30   54  
16 70 75 80 61.6 70 34.5 54/72 100 **85
17 76 80 90 61.6 70 39.5 54/72 100 **85
18 82 80 100 83.3 80 45.5 54/72 100 **85
19 88 100  83.3 80 52.5   100 **85
20 94    83.3 80 61.5     100
21 100    83.3 100 72.5   
22      100  85    
23          100   
Notes:
    * Compared to a married person with 9 years’ experience.
    ** Only during ﬁ  rst 90 days of  employment, and full-time students subject to ofﬁ  cial permission and con-
    straints on hours of  work.
Sources:  Federale Overheidsdienst Werkgelegenheid, Arbeid en Sociaal Overleg (Belgium); Ministère du Travail et 
  de l’Emploi Luxembourg; www.travail-solidarite.gouv.fr/spip.php?page=article&id_article=1027)
  (France);  www.lowpay.gov.uk/lowpay/lowpay2005/appendix4.shtml  (UK and Portugal:); Foto-
  niata and Moutos (2008) (Greece); Citizens Information (Ireland:); Netherlands: Table 1; 
  www.lowpay.gov.uk/lowpay/lowpay2005/appendix4.shtml (Spain). 
  www.dol.gov/esa/minwage/q-a.htm#young (US). (Courtesy Maarten van Klaveren.)Page ● 42
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Table 3 shows that the Dutch situation strongly deviates from those in other EU countries. At 
23 years, the Netherlands has the highest age at which the adult minimum starts to apply, and it also 
has by far the lowest relative levels for youths, down to 30 per cent of the adult rate at the age of 15 
years – roughly half the next-lowest level.
At the same time, the Netherlands has about the highest youth employment rate among OECD 
countries, together with a very high overlap between education and labour market activity. This is 
largely explained by the fact that Dutch youth employment also has the highest shares of part-time 
low-paid jobs among young employees: more than half of all young employees (35 percentage points 
of the 68 per cent employment-population rate) have a low-wage jobs of fewer than 35 hours (Fig-
ure 14). Most (20 percentage points out of the 35 per cent) of these part-time jobs are small or very 
small, that is, fewer than 15 hours a week. This reﬂ  ects the very drastic change that the Dutch youth 
labour market has undergone in recent decades. The current level represents a ﬁ  vefold increase com-
pared to 1979 when only 10 per cent of young employees34 were in part-time low-paid jobs (see also 
Salverda et al., 2008, 53). As a result youth employment has lost much of its better paid and full-time 
part and has become strongly concentrated in small low-wage jobs whose occupants combine such 
labour-market activity with an education. The participation of Dutch youth in education is as high 
as in other countries. Therefore there is a strong overlap for Dutch youth between paid labour and 
education that explains the large difference with e.g. France (Figure 14) where such overlap is virtu-
ally absent. It is an issue for further research whether such overlap is good for educational efforts or 
not.  At the same time it is clear that the participation in education is not signiﬁ  cantly higher than in 
other countries in spite of the argument that low minimum wages would inspire youth to dedicate 
themselves to education.
34  Age 16–22 only, plausibly implying an overestimation compared to 15–24.Page ● 43
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Figure 14: Youth employment rate divided into low-wage part-time and full-time and the





























Source: Author’s own calculations based on ECHP; of  US calculations on CPS (courtesy John Schmitt).
Evidence in the retail trade sector
Youth employment is strongly related to the retail trade. About one third of all young employees 
work in that sector and among this group between 40 and 50 per cent have a job of fewer than 12 
hours per week, four times the national average. About 17 per cent of young retail workers earn the 
age-speciﬁ  c minimum wage – this is slightly higher than the youth average and almost four times 
higher than the national average for all ages.
Therefore this seems the right industry to enable us to consider the pros and cons of the system 
of youth minimum wages and to discuss them with unions, employers and experts. This was done by 
means of a special seminar with an invited audience of union representatives, employers and some 
expert organisations in the supermarket branch of this particular industry. It was held at the Am-
sterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS) in July 2008 as part of the preparations for 
the present chapter.35 The seminar happened to be held during a time of negotiations about a new 
collective agreement for the supermarkets in which the structure of pay for young employees was an 
important issue for discussion because of the tension between age-related minimum wages and expe-
35  I am particularly grateful to Maarten van Klaveren at the AIAS for co-organising this meeting.Page ● 44
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rience rating. First, information was given about the minimum wage, low pay, youth employment and 
the retail trade, part of which is presented here. This was followed by a discussion about the effects 
of youth minimum wages on the youth labour market and the quality of retail-trade employment and 
the views of the different parties present at the meeting.
The long tail has two important implications: relatively strong wage increases occur as young 
people age by one year and shift to the next-higher youth minimum wage, and levels of pay are low 
in an absolute sense. The former can stimulate mutual wage competition between youths of different 
ages – employers may feel tempted to reduce labour costs by substituting the youngest teenagers for 
the somewhat older youths, say the 19 to 22 year olds. One evident implication is a lack of incen-
tives for on-the-job training for both employees and employers as for the former there is no clear 
reward of experience and increased ability while the latter can easily substitute older, more expensive 
youths by much cheaper cohorts. According to the unions, the fact that a newly hired person one year 
older will receive a higher wage in spite of having less experience is considered unfair by employees. 
Second, the absolutely low levels of the wages can affect labour supply and labour demand as well. 
On the demand side, low wages stimulate the labour intensity of demand because of its cheapness 
and diminish the stimulus for increasing the labour productivity of production as investments be-
come relatively expensive. On the labour supply side, low pay may make employment less attractive 
to potential workers both against other industries with better pay and participation in education or 
even non-employment. Though this situation may indeed stimulate young people to stay longer in 
education instead of opting for paid work – one of the three arguments put forward for the current 
system by the Ministry – it may also discourage the human-capital investment needed for jobs that 
do start at the youth minimum-wage level (for example, vocational education for retail sales jobs)36. 
In addition, the fact that the wage level is low may reinforce the trend towards the supply of labour 
on a part-time basis because of the higher, more favourable take-home pay ratio for small jobs which 
results from the progressive tax system which charges the lower part-time income relatively less (see 
next case study). It induces a shift in labour supply towards categories of workers who primarily seek 
additional income (e.g. students with a grant or second earners in a household37) and do not need a 
36  Compare Salverda et al (2008), 95 ff.
37  See Salverda et al. (2008) for further analysis of this labour market competition, including the more favourable starting 
point for student competitors because of the grant system.Page ● 45
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full income from labour for their living. Taken together these effects can give rise to a vicious circle of 
casual labour leading, on the one hand, to a deprofessionalisation of the work force which negatively 
affects the quality of production and, ultimately, also product demand, and, on the other hand, to an 
increased volatility of the work force, which diminishes the appeal of the working environment.
At the seminar, worries about the potential effects of the predominance of casual labour were 
shared by the three parties, albeit to different degrees. The possible negative effects on human capital 
investment were acknowledged by experts and unions in particular. It is becoming increasingly dif-
ﬁ  cult to ﬁ  nd full-time employment that would be a proper reward for low-level but adequate educa-
tional attainment and thus to ﬁ  nd the starting point of the corresponding labour market career. The 
employers pointed to increasing efforts in on-the-job training to encourage attachment to the ﬁ  rm 
and the trade, and also mentioned being unable to ﬁ  nd youths willing to work shifts on a full-time ba-
sis, for reasons they did not understand. Second, unions stressed the unfair treatment of experience 
as a result of the signiﬁ  cant year-on-year changes imposed by the youth minimum wage. In their view 
the link between job level and wage level – a normal feature of any employment relationship above 
the age of 22 – is absent below the age of 23 as a consequence of youth minimum wages. Third, the 
employer side worried about the resulting high turnover of personnel, citing an establishment where 
it was over 100 per cent in a year. Unions endorsed that worry but blamed it on the unattractiveness 
of work other than as a casual job. The seminar concluded to the desirability of introducing elements 
of experience rating in the wage structure aimed at superseding the effects of the increases of the 
youth minimum wage which are based solely on age ignoring experience. Thus the role of the youth 
minimum wage would be diminished.
Soon afterwards a new collective labour agreement for supermarkets was concluded by employ-
ers and unions which took some ﬁ  rst steps away from the purely age-based system inspired by the 
youth minimum wages towards some experience rating for 18- and 19-year olds to improve career 
prospects and fairness. In addition, the social partners agreed to consider the innovative develop-
ments in the sector and the future treatment of young employees in more detail during the two-year 
duration of the new contract. This amounts to a break from the current Dutch structure of youth 
minimum wages by the most important sector for youth employment. It seems to suggest that the 
Dutch long-tailed approach provides a good example of trade-offs between minimum wage short-
run and long-term effects, between more and better jobs, in the European debate on the minimum Page ● 46
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wage. Unsurprisingly, the recently introduced minimum wages in the UK and Ireland chose not to 
copy the Dutch treatment of young workers38and let the youth minimum diverge much less from the 
adult rate.
The case study serves to show how the Dutch minimum wage system has stuck to very low wages 
for young workers for several decades and how gradually unions and employers in the industries most 
affected are beginning to realise the downside for motivating young workers and innovating their own 
business. While eventual EU policy making will certainly pay special attention to the treatment of 
young workers it a long tail of low wages seems a dead alley for both employees and employers. The 
special treatment should preferably aim ate a very modest youth differential and pay attention to its 
effects on fairness and innovative HR practices and therefore perhaps allow a young worker’s move-
ment to the adult rate on the basis of individual experience and productivity.
Case study 2: The part-time trap of taxation at the  5.2. 
minimum wage
The country of part-time: what overlap with the minimum wage?
The Netherlands is known for its very high rate of part-time employment: ‘the ﬁ  rst part-time 
economy in the world’ (Richard Freeman). As various other countries and also the European Union 
as a whole via its Lisbon Agenda are trying to stimulate the growth of part-time jobs, it is worth prob-
ing deeper into the relationship between working part-time and the minimum wage.
38  Compare Salverda (2000).Page ● 47
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Source: Calculated from CPB, 2006, Table A.7, keeping annual full-time hours at 1840.
Dutch part-time employment has evolved rapidly: since the 1970s basically all additional jobs 
have been part-time. This has gone hand in hand with an equally impressive increase in adult female 
employment. Since the mid-1990s a larger share of the population has been employed than ever be-
fore (Figure 15). However, in terms of hours worked the growth of employment has been strikingly 
different. After 1970 15 years of continuous decline were followed after 1985 by another 15 years of 
growth up to a full-time equivalent employment-population ratio of about 50 per cent. By 2001 this 
growth had made up for only half the preceding decline and it was followed by a new decrease that 
brought 2005 back to the level of 1979.
The persons/hours distinction is important in general, but it is even more important for the 
lower end of the Dutch labour market where minimum-wage jobs and low pay are found. Figure 16, 
left-hand part, shows that the incidence of the minimum wage decreases rapidly with the length of 
the working week. Of those working fewer than 12 hours one third are paid the minimum on an 
hourly basis and that group makes up almost 40 per cent of all minimum-wage earners. Conversely, Page ● 48
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among those working full time, only 5 per cent are paid at the minimum wage, and they make up 28 
per cent of minimum wage earners.39
The right-hand part of the ﬁ  gure indicates the implications of both working shorter hours and 
being paid the minimum wage on the basis of annual earnings. Now a much larger share of employ-
ees (1.95 as against 0.7 million employees, or 28 per cent as against 10 per cent of all employees40), 
earn at or below the minimum, including virtually all workers in the smallest jobs (94 per cent). All 
part-time workers taken together – deﬁ  ned as persons working fewer than 35 hours a week – make 
up some 70 per cent of minimum-wage earners by the hour and 90 per cent of them by the year. In 
other words, the present-day minimum wage is almost entirely a part-time affair. As we have seen, the 
current share of 70 per cent contrasts strongly with the 25 per cent level of 1979. Virtually the same 
trend has occurred in low-wage employment (Salverda et al., 2008). Clearly, this ‘part-time-isation’ of 
low-wage jobs and labour supply to these jobs makes it increasingly difﬁ  cult for low-skilled school-
leavers and unemployed to ﬁ  nd the full-time employment that would be needed to generate sufﬁ  cient 
income for a living.
39  For a further discussion see Salverda et al. (2008).
40  An estimated 16 per cent of all hours worked on an annual basis.Page ● 49
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Figure 16: Minimum-wage incidence among employees and working hours shares among 
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earnings statistics.
The stimulus of net pay in part-time employment
Apparently, there are stimuli for working part-time.41 A full study is outside the scope of this 
contribution but would comprise the competitive behaviour in the labour market of the supply 
of students and second earners in households already receiving a living wage. Here we focus on a 
relatively recent policy development that hinges on the central role of the net minimum wage in the 
Dutch system of social security. On the net–gross dimension it is important to realise, especially in 
relation to part-time employment, how taxation and social contributions affect the take-home pay in 
the earnings range below the minimum wage.
Income tax and obligatory, national social contributions42 evolve differently over the wage dis-
tribution – tax rates increase with income, but contributions have constant rates and are paid up to 
a certain income threshold only – but the two have become increasingly intertwined. The contribu-
tions to national social insurance (old-age pension,43 widows/orphans scheme, substantial health 
41  See Taner and Hendrix (2007) for a detailed treatment of the Dutch poverty trap, including a part-time trap.
42  Note that employee social security contributions (unemployment, disability) are kept separate.
43  Note that one qualiﬁ  es for national social security regardless of contributions made or not. After a life of low income 
because of part-time work one will still be entitled to receive the full state old-age pension AOW.Page ● 50
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care costs) have been effectively integrated into the structure of income taxation. Taxation of low 
incomes is only 2.45 per cent of taxable income but at the same time the national insurance contribu-
tions at that level amount to 31.15 per cent.
As in other countries the progressive nature of income taxation is a general factor that helps to 
understand the popularity of part-time jobs because net earnings decline less than proportionally 
with gross earnings at shorter working hours compared to longer hours. A speciﬁ  c Dutch factor is 
that the current system of income taxation comprises several tax credits that are of equal monetary 
value to every tax payer. The most important of these, the General Tax Credit (maximum €2074), 
is deductible for all taxpayers. It is also important that the tax credit can actually be paid by the tax 
authorities to the partner in a household with no or a very low own income (less than €6172).44 This 
implies that on the ﬁ  rst €6172 of earnings no tax is paid – as already mentioned for the lowest youth 
minimum wages. In a sense, this is a generalisation of the German mini-jobs but without the disad-
vantages that the occupants of those jobs acquire no social-beneﬁ  t entitlements or that permission 
for creating the job is needed from the tax authorities. In addition, the Labour Tax Credit phases in 
(maximum €1443) with the increase of earnings up to the level of about the adult minimum wage 
(€19,000). This is done in a speciﬁ  c fashion: for earnings up to half the minimum wage the credit is 
very low (1.758 per cent), while for the second half up to the full minimum wage it is 12.43 per cent. 
The existence of this credit and the nature of its phasing are intended to beneﬁ  t paid work over social 
beneﬁ  ts. This seems an attempt to get around the equation of the net minimum wage with net mini-
mum social beneﬁ  ts, which has been at the core of the Dutch social policy model since the 1970s, to 
allow an increase in net income when moving from beneﬁ  t to employment.
44  Maximum payment is €2074 or the tax paid by the earning partner if that is less. This practice will be discontinued in 
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Figure 17: Marginal tax rates by level of annual earnings, individual single and dual earners



























































Notes:  Rate for income tax including national social-security contributions (to the state pension and the widow(er)s 
  and orphans scheme which are integrated in the tax system) and compulsory health insurance (ZVW), but 
  before contributions to employee social insurance, pensions and early retirement. The presence of  children is 
 disregarded.
    MW-1/2 = 50% of  MW, MW = minimum wage, LPT = low-pay threshold.
Source: Author’s own calculations based on tax data.
Taken together these factors signiﬁ  cantly affect take-home pay and marginal tax rates for the low 
paid, especially between half the minimum wage and the low-pay threshold of two thirds of median 
earnings, which is situated between € 21,000 and 22,000 annually. Figure 17 indicates outcomes up to 
an earnings level of € 25,000 for individual earners who do not share a household or, as a dual earner, 
share it with a partner with sufﬁ  cient own earnings on the one hand, and traditional single breadwin-
ners with a non-earning partner on the other hand. It shows marginal rates which are clearly lower 
in the range from 50% to 100% of the minimum wage, when it starts to rise sharply, doubling up to 
the level of low pay. This led to a lower marginal tax rate than before below the minimum wage45 but 
45  Note that the introduction and increase of the Labour Tax Credit has helped the purchasing power of the net mini-
mum wage to slightly increase in recent years in spite of the freeze of the gross minimum wage between July 2003 
and January 2006.Page ● 52
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also to a strongly and further increasing marginal rate over earnings right above the minimum wage 
on an annual basis.46 
For the labour supply of individual workers this situation seems to bring about a ‘part-time trap’. 
It is important to realise that this effect will be felt at higher job levels and higher levels of hourly as 
it gives people an incentive to work part-time with the effect of keeping annual earnings below the 
minimum wage. As we have seen more than 28 per cent of all employees earn less than the minimum 
wage annually, in stark contrast to the much lower percentage of employees of only 4 per cent who 
actually earn the (age-related) minimum wage on an hourly basis, or for that matter the 10 per cent 
who earn less than the hourly adult minimum wage. The latter two statistics grossly underestimate 
the signiﬁ  cance of the minimum wage for labour incomes in the Netherlands that results from low 
numbers of hours on the job and the concomitant low level of annual earnings.
Contributions to social security are more complicated to envisage than the income-tax effects 
because they are basically levied on the hourly wage and not the annual total, and also because they 
differ somewhat between sectors of the economy. The employee pays 3.5 per cent for Unemploy-
ment Insurance while total employer contributions vary around 19.7 per cent for disability insurance, 
unemployment insurance, child care and health care insurance (the 7.2 per cent already mentioned) 
together. All such contributions are levied up to a maximum level of earnings which is well above 
the minimum wage. Importantly, employer UI contributions are not levied over the ﬁ  rst €16,000. 
Consequently, not far below the full minimum wage employer contributions jump from 14.9 to 19.7 
per cent. In addition, employers contribute signiﬁ  cantly to occupational pensions. However, these 
contributions are normally not levied below the minimum wage (on an hourly basis) as these pen-
sions factor in the state old-age pension corresponding to that minimum and exempt earnings up to 
that level. This adds a part-time trap on the labour demand side to that of supply.
The conclusion from this is that the minimum wage has a much broader signiﬁ  cance for labour 
inputs into the economy than its level as an hourly wage would suggest. This stimulates working part-
time employment in itself (at higher levels of pay) but also reinforces part-time work in the low-wage 
labour market. For hourly labour costs it may be cheaper to pay workers above the (hourly) minimum 
46  Employee social security contributions such as for UI, for which earnings up to about the minimum wage are ex-
empted, reinforce this increase and so do obligatory pension contributions which also have an exemption up to the 
minimum wage.Page ● 53
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wage as long as they work part-time than to hire a full-time employee paid at or above the minimum 
wage. The rapidly growing overlap between minimum-wage and low-wage employment and part-time 
employment negatively affects the chances of low-skilled workers of ﬁ  nding adequate employment 
with sufﬁ  cient working hours to have decent wage. Basically, the relevance of the Dutch minimum 
wage is now mainly restricted to part-time employment. 
The important implication for the European minimum-wage debate is that this should not focus 
exclusively on the formal minimum wage, its level and employment incidence, but should take into 
account the context of income taxation and social contributions and consider not only the number 
of employees working at the minimum wage but also the number of hours worked. The rationale 
of a minimum wage is to ensure a ‘living wage’ for full-time hours, not only an additional income 
for part-time hours, and its level together with the tax treatment should be seen in that perspective. 
A second, more indirect lesson is that linking the (net) minimum wage to public ﬁ  nance and social 
security can generate unexpected problems which are difﬁ  cult to solve.Page ● 54
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Conclusions 6. 
We have found a very strong absolute and relative decline in the Dutch minimum wage, a long 
tail of youth minimum wages down to very low levels of wages, and a strong and still increasing re-
striction of minimum wage jobs to part-time employment. Fundamentally, it seems to show that the 
Dutch minimum wage has undergone the effects of long years of wage moderation more strongly 
than wage levels higher up the distribution and has effectively lost its role as a bottom to wage forma-
tion.
A possible European drive towards a more uniform approach would ﬁ  rst single out the very long 
tail of Dutch youth minimum wages as deviating too strongly from the situation in other countries. 
It is signiﬁ  cant that the minimum wages recently introduced in the UK and Ireland have not adopted 
such a tail. A European view of the treatment of youth would more likely affect the Dutch situation 
than the other way around.
Second, the Dutch experience could inspire the European debate to pay attention to the relation-
ship between the minimum wage and working part-time. Plausibly, it would not help the expansion of 
part-time employment, advocated as part of the European employment strategy and the Lisbon tar-
gets, if part-time jobs were seen as second rate when the level of a country’s minimum wage tended 
to decline because of a linkage to such jobs and as a result became insufﬁ  cient and inconsequential 
for full-time employees. Naturally, such a link would not be explicit in policy making because of its 
discriminatory effects but it would become apparent in labour market practice as it does in the Neth-
erlands. One important implication of this chapter is that it is advisable to consider the minimum 
wage not only as a gross amount in the distribution of wages but also in relation to income taxation 
of wages below and just above the minimum wage.
Third, the strong decline of the Dutch minimum wage in terms of both purchasing power and 
relative position in the wage distribution throws up the question of how the uprating issue can be 
dealt with in the European debate. If a certain level of the minimum wage were commonly agreed, Page ● 56
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regardless of whether it was absolute or relative, what would the Members States’ leeway be for 
changing this over time? 
Finally, it seems advisable to keep the European discussion focused on the minimum wage as a 
labour market instrument in its own right and to disregard possible institutional linkages to social 
security. This includes paying attention to the effects at somewhat higher levels of pay up to, say, 
the low-pay threshold. An evolution (read decline) of the minimum wage that goes together with an 
unchanged level of low-wage employment – as in the US – no longer provides an effective bottom 
to wage formation.Page ● 57
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